

Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: A Security Perspective from 1999 to 2023

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Abstract

Pakistan and Afghanistan experienced a complex and dynamics relationship from October 1999 to March 2013 shaped by global phenomena including US-Led war on terror and the emergence of Taliban. Though there were instances where the two nations; Pakistan and Afghanistan, collaborated, they often distrusted and accused each other. Despite some period of understanding and working together, both countries had a difficult relationship often caused by doubt and blame. Nevertheless, they have common past and related societies. This makes it important that they collaborate more closely for the sake of peace and development in the region. Therefore, this study aims at looking into the factors that have steered relations of both countries over a particular period choosing to zero in on major occurrences and developments that have impacted on this relations. In order to achieve this goal, an extensive literature review was carried out in order to gain an in-depth analysis of the close tie between Pakistan and Afghanistan during the specified duration.

Keywords: Pakistan-Afghanistan, Security, Regional Stability, Cooperation

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been complicated and full of ups and downs, characterized by a long history of cultural, political and economic links between them. But much of what happened from October 1999 to March 2013 was dictated by external forces like US-led war on terror and emergence of the Taliban again in Afghanistan. The relationship between both countries in this era was characterized by many bouts of partnership and antagonism. General Pervez Musharraf led a military coup in Pakistan in October 1999, which was met with strong disapproval from Afghanistan and the world at large. This stained the relationship between the two countries considering the new military regime of Pakistan as a danger to democracy and stability in the area. Further deterioration was also due to the Pakistan's support to the Taliban government in Afghanistan and was considered as one of the major problems to peace and security within the area. Following the heinous acts on September 11, relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan assumed a different dimensions. After this catastrophe, US imposed a condition requiring Pakistan to break all contacts with the Taliban and help in the fight against terrorism.

Under intense international pressure, General Musharraf had acquiesced to back US-led coalition forces vying with the Taliban in Afghanistan. It was a momentous pivot in the nation's foreign relations since it used to view Taliban as an ally and strategic asset.

The cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan during this period was largely driven by their shared goal of defeating the Taliban and eradicating terrorism from the region. However, this cooperation was often marred by mistrust and accusations from both sides. The fact that both countries had a lot of work to do managing the terrorists who were common to them prompted their partnership despite the suspicion and counter accusations which could still remain in place of either of them relaxed. Pakistan was accused by Afghanistan of giving sanctuary to militants from Taliban but conversely Pakistan stated that Afghanistan harbored militant groups which attacked Pakistan thus occurrence frequently resulted into border skirmishes and weak relations prevailed.

The US informed its plans to withdraw troops from Afghanistan in 2009. As it happened, this had an impact the dynamism of the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There was a risk for leadership gap in Afghanistan, so both countries decided to build bridges, therefore there would be no disruptions caused by what was happening there. In 2011, a partnership agreement was signed between both countries to explain cooperation regarding trade, security, and counterterrorism. These efforts notwithstanding, Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have not been smooth sailing in this context. US's drone attacks in Pakistan's tribal belt have aggravated the previously fragile relations between the two countries because they sometimes killed innocent people. The presence of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan has also created social and economic problems, leading to raising a tension again.

In March 2013, the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan faced another setback when the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban and hindering the peace process in Afghanistan. This accusation led to a halt in negotiations between the two countries and further deteriorated their relationship.

Musa Khan Jalalzai in his book, "The Pipeline War in Afghanistan" revealed the part played by Pakistani Chief of Staff in reinforcing the United Nations Peace Plan for the solution of problems in Afghanistan. Afghans highly praised the Taliban for terminating the situation of chaos. The apprehensions related to irredentism of Afghans about the question of Pushtoonistan effectively vanished after the rise of Taliban. Religious political parties backing Taliban's extreme measures had gathered encouragement throughout Pakistan. Afghan situation backed religious extremism in Pakistan.

Gouher Rizwi in his book 'South Asia in Changing International Order' chapter 3 titled 'End of external intervention in Afghanistan: Towards chaos or accommodation' penned those relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan had never been pleasant owing to Afghanistan's assertion to the areas where Pashto was spoken in Baluchistan and NWFP. President Dawood of Afghanistan reintroduced the backing for Pushtoonistan to extend his term. Bhutto had been helping Afghans who ran away from their administration's brutalities in the optimism of toppling Afghan administration and substituting it with a government moldable to Pakistan's desires.

Bhabani Sen Gupta in his book “Afghanistan Politics, Economics and Society” wrote that the Afghan ruler criticized the border settlements with the British in 1949 and claimed that Pashtun-speaking regions in Pakistan should be granted freedom as an independent state of Pushtoonistan. Pakistan sealed the borders on which Afghanistan relied profoundly for ingresses. Bhutto blamed Sardar Daud for preparing 15000 Baloch and Pushtoon in Afghanistan for intrusion into NWFP and Baluchistan. Both the rulers were nearly about to conclude an agreement to oust the Pushtun and Baloch sponsors from Afghanistan in 1977.

Iqtidar Karamat Cheema in his book “New World Order Past and Present” wrote that after 9/11 Afghanistan turn out to be a strategic problem rather than an advantage for Pakistan. In order to successfully follow his new Afghan strategy, General Musharraf brought variations in the highest armed chain of command to de-Talibanize Pakistani approach towards Afghanistan. On 5th September 2006 Taliban fighters contracted a ceasefire settlement with the administration of Pakistan, promising not to start cross border assaults in Afghanistan and not to accommodate overseas militants but they broke their promise on July 15, 2007. To stabilize the administration of Afghanistan under President Karzai modifications in the Pakistani madrassas are significant in fighting radicalism for the reason that they have connection with overthrown Afghan Taliban regime.

Farooq Hasnat in his book “Pakistan Unresolved Issues of State and Society” wrote in chapter 12 titled “Afghanistan’s unrelenting crisis and its repercussions on Pakistan” that the army institution turned out to be infatuated with the rule of Taliban in Afghanistan. It considered the predictable strong hold of the Taliban on the territory of Afghanistan as the confirmation of Pakistani defense. The foreign minister of Pakistan, Abdul Sattar two days prior to 9/11 proclaimed that Pakistan appreciates cordial affairs with Afghanistan and the restrictions on its neighbor are not acceptable. Two Pakistani delegations after 9/11 toured Kandahar demanding Mullah Omer to adopt suitable steps to diffuse the state of affairs. Three months had been taken by Pakistani General Musharraf after 9/11 to acknowledge that Taliban sponsored Pakistani terrorists were blamable for sectarian assassinations in Pakistan. The position of Pakistan was not too strong as it had already lost its standing to accomplish any significant part in the divided and unstable Afghan social order.

Nazir Hussain in the book “Pakistan Unresolved Issues of State and Society” wrote in chapter titled “War on Terrorism Implications for Pakistan” that after 9/11 the support from Pakistan and General Musharraf secured unceasing appreciation for the part played in combat against extremism in the region. Pakistan suffered sectarian and religious extremism for the past several years owing to Taliban philosophy and a number of Pakistani citizens who were influenced by their ideology. The native Taliban and their followers in the guise of Pakistani religious-political parties produced a life-threatening sectarian and religious rift in the republic. The combat against terrorism forced Pakistan to assent an unfriendly Northern Alliance rule in Afghanistan. The strategy creators of Pakistan had been cornering the Northern Alliance throughout the previous years.

General Pervaiz Musharraf in the book “In the Line of Fire” penned that Pakistan was one of the only republics continuing ambassadorial dealings with the Taliban and their front-runner Mullah Omer for geostrategic purpose to avert the formation of an opponent in the western border. However, the fear of satisfying the power void by Northern Alliance composed of anti-Pakistan elements remained. Pakistan was forced by USA after the September 11, 2001 event to close all transportation of fuel and several additional

commodities to Taliban including the trainees and volunteers to Afghanistan, which could be used in armed violent capability or to encourage an extremist threat. With the progression of the war, the Northern Alliance and the coalition forces of United States of America pushed against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and several of them ran away, crossed the boundary and entered into Pakistani cities and tribal areas. Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omer vanished.

Rasul Buksh Rais on 25th December 2006 penned an investigation “Incredible Line On Afghanistan” in The Daily Times in which he indicated that it must be clear that dealings with Afghanistan set up the utmost essential regional association for Pakistan in the context of the latter’s safety. The features that have a bearing on Pakistan’s domestic safety are permeable borders, common ethnicity, relocation, immigrants in addition to undertakings of non-state players. The situation ought to be clear that the uncertainty and unpredictability of Afghanistan will devise great influence on Pakistan’s strength and safety. Pakistan’s avowed strategy of non-involvement as well as backing to global alliance of armies aimed at steadying Afghanistan lacks reliability. With each event of ferocity, foreign broadcasting, the Afghan administration and then most significantly the US blame Pakistan. Islamabad’s reaction towards these allegations has not altered a little. The representative of foreign affairs department delivers the similar line over and again that Afghanistan and world-wide alliance of powers have nosedived in their struggles to protect and stabilize the republic, then they use Pakistan as a victim for their individual flaws.

Fahd Hussain on 25th August 2011 composed an article “New Report Attempts To Make Sense” in Daily Times with an opinion that the two-fold dominant aims of what a Pakistani course of action ought to be that the settlement in Afghanistan must not lead towards an undesirable spill over, such that the situation adds to more unpredictability in Pakistan or causes anger amid Pushtuns of Pakistan; plus the regime in Afghanistan must not be aggressive towards Pakistan. Besides it should not permit its land to be used contrary to national securities of Pakistan. The report is a combined work of the US Peace Institute and the Jinnah Institute, and goes by the long-drawn-out name mentioned as “Pakistan, the US and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite”. It clarifies that as soon as transformed into practical strategy, these aims lead Pakistan on the road to chase three consequences: A mark of stability in Afghanistan, an all-encompassing administration in the Afghan capital, Kabul besides restricting the influence of India to improvement projects. This means encountering certain genuineness that India is active towards mischief-making in Afghanistan, and Pakistan can pay no attention to the danger, the Durand Line remains more permeable than ever in the past, besides the reverse strategic depth sensation is converting into a main safety nightmare for Pakistan, Haqqani group remains deep-rooted in North Waziristan, TTP is getting power from the Afghan Taliban, geographical immediacy of its base to Afghanistan plus shutting our perceptiveness to Afghanistan won’t solve the problem.

Ali Chaudhry in July 2012 composed an article in Jahangir World Times titled “Chicago Summit and beyond” remarks about the unavoidable part Pakistan can play in search of a way out of conflict, which continues to challenge military resolutions in spite of major investment of vigor, time, and durable army equipment. President Zardari devoted \$20 million intended for Afghanistan regardless of deteriorating monetary situation back in

Pakistan, which point to Pakistani determination to make an effort for Afghan affluence and strength.

Mubashar Hasan on 29th June 2010 wrote an article in the Daily Times “Americans in Afghanistan” and cited that Afghan administrators suspected that General Kayani of Pakistan offered to broker an agreement with Afghan Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader and sent representatives to Kabul from another rebellious Afghan frontrunner, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, with a 15-point peace plan offer in March 2010. The New York Times declares that Pakistan offered itself to President Karzai as a new reliable partner for Afghanistan after its bitter experience with the USA. Pakistani bureaucrats claimed that they can hand over the Haqqani network who was a supporter of al Qaeda and controls a major part of the insurrection in Afghanistan, in a power-sharing plan. Agreeing to Jane Perlez and her corresponding reporters, General Ashfaq Kayani of Pakistan remains an acquaintance of Afghan President Karzai and the Pakistani general similarly workout substantial power on Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a long-time Pakistani supporter as well as Afghan Taliban front-runners Mullah Omar.

Huma Yusef on 3rd August 2009 wrote in Dawn “Back to Square One” that international debate regarding radicalism has highlighted that the key to defeating the Al Qaeda as well as Taliban in Afghanistan is eliminating radical safe havens in Pakistan. Pakistan presently discovers itself with more or less general consent against violence and certain thoughtfulness at the official level regarding the significance of continued contribution by means of army existence in addition to commercial growth in Malakand as well as FATA. The domino effect of the inconsistent struggles in Afghanistan can have a fore most effect on the risky tussle against violence in Pakistan. The United States soldier’s armed ambition in the area creeps up to push more Afghan Taliban into Pakistan, mainly throughout the recent pause in combat to consent for the rehabilitation of the internally displaced people. If the Afghan administrations and America need to discourse with the Taliban, Pakistan will surely stay tangled. Even if the ISI is not in contact with the radical headship, there cannot be any doubt that multifaceted commitment will remain just the incentive our organizations require on the way to recuperate deep-rooted companionships.

Khalid Aziz on 10th June 2011 in Dawn discussed in his article “The Dangers of Afghan War” that the Pakistani political-military heads back the general objective of crushing Taliban fanaticism and counteracting radicalism; nevertheless, the inhabitants are not categorically fretful with this aim and remain actually more upset by the day-to-day business of surviving in gradually more difficult circumstances. Pakistani public feeling is perceived to generally back the Taliban alleged as fighting a battle of freedom against an external aggressor. Huge regions of the state that provide the fighters for the army are likewise areas that have over the past two decades developed into the breeding ground of extremism and backed troops who have fought the United States military in Afghanistan as well as struggled against the Pakistan Army in Swat and FATA. They stay at the moment committed that they are fighting a self-protective jihad against the American and Pakistani military intended for the free will of Afghanistan, a Muslim country.

Moeed Yusuf on 26th March 2012 wrote an article in Dawn ‘Afghan Complaints’ in which he claimed that Islamabad is responsible for creating rifts between the different ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Pakistan remains as some of the most unpopular republics in surveys conducted in Afghanistan because Pakistani security institution has intervened and

influenced consequence in Afghanistan and Inter-Services Intelligence has sustained ferocity in Afghanistan. The national strategies of Pakistan worry the Afghans.

“Afghan Allegations” a news clipping in Dawn on 3rd March 2006 states that Pakistan Foreign Office repudiated the wrong allegation of Afghan administration that individuals from Pakistan are causing complications in Afghanistan. Pakistan has positioned 80,000 troops along Afghan border. Taliban operatives exist both in Pakistan and Afghanistan besides the geography of the region aid fighters to move across the Durand line without obstruction. 2300 km extensive boundary cannot be sealed completely. Close collaboration amongst security forces can help decrease the problem.

Statement of the Problem

Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan is combination of stormy, estranged and friendly relations. Soon after the independence of Pakistan, Afghanistan did not show any friendly gestures towards Pakistan. The era of 1947 to 1979 was marked by the problems of the Pakhtoonistan and Durand Line. After Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, jihad against Soviet Union, its withdrawal and internal struggle within Afghanistan were main issues. The Taliban rule was a time when relations between both the states were better than that of their past history. That too did not last for long and there was a change in the nature of relations. Both the states had to change their foreign policy due to the event of 9/11. The relations between both the states have been strained after United States intervention in Afghanistan and its demand to Pakistan for support in war against terrorism.

Pakistan government had to deal with the religious political parties which were protesting against the government and extending support to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan had to provide airbases to the US and land routes to NATO forces to conduct military operation in Afghanistan. Pakistan also had to make sure that Indian influence in Afghanistan should not increase, harming the interest of Pakistan.

Pakistan cannot afford to have a hostile Afghanistan as a neighbor and it needs to normalize its relations with the Afghan government. It also needs to find long term solution to the problems both the states are facing and resolve them peacefully.

Research questions

- What are the main factors that define Pakistan foreign policy towards Afghanistan?
- How Pakistan’s security is linked with Afghanistan?
- What were the major constraints and challenges in Pakistan Afghanistan relations from October 1999 to March 2013?

Objectives of study

- To study in detail the factors that defined Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan
- To investigate the main issues in Pakistan foreign policy towards Afghanistan from October 1999- March 2013
- To evaluate the influence and the role of external actors in shaping up Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan

Research Methodology

Descriptive and analytical methods of research were used. Descriptive method was helpful in describing events and situations, how things were at a particular time whereas analytical method enables the researcher to give an explanation and reasons about the questions that arise based on the findings.

Secondary source of information comprising books, journals, newspaper articles, and news clippings were used.

Significance

The significance of the study lies in the fact that Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan had a great impact on the internal as well as on the external dynamics of Pakistan and Afghanistan, particularly from 2000-2012. The tribal splits, extensive dishonesty, plus fragile central administration that plague Afghanistan likewise have Pakistan concerned about a weakening administration in its backyard. Pakistan is similarly worried about the safety issues that have surfaced due to Afghan government's lack of capability to address cross-border infiltration and incidents of terrorist activities taking place in both the countries. Resultantly presence of Taliban in both states and their collaboration in carrying out violent activities is an issue of grave concern for both the states.

PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS (OCTOBER 1999- MARCH 2013)

In the year 1999 Pakistan had been supporting the Taliban regime but after 9/11 the Taliban regime was subject to criticism and alienation from the entire international community. USA launched operation enduring freedom in Afghanistan against the Taliban government and Al-Qaida network, as Al Qaeda was given shelter in Afghanistan by the Taliban regime. Pakistan supported US forces and encircled the Taliban regime. Leaders of Al-Qaida like Osama bin Laden¹ and Taliban took refuge in Pakistan and started to attack the NATO troops and Coalition forces. A faction of Pakistani Taliban (TTP) started to target the armed forces of Pakistan.

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations before 9/11

President Pervaiz Musharraf stressed the international community to remove the economic and political sanctions on the Taliban government. He is reported to have said later that Pakistan recognized Taliban and was constantly criticize by West. He stated President Bill Clinton of USA toured Pakistan in 2000 to caution him. Musharraf explained the need to recognize Taliban so that their isolation ends and their conditions improve.² This would have facilitated the Taliban to have an opportunity to flow in the political mainstream of the international community. Pakistan continued its political support to the Taliban government and Pakistan's consulate was opened for the diplomatic and official discussion. Pakistan's aim to function its embassy in Afghanistan was to be in contact with the Taliban government and to open a window for Taliban government to communicate with the global community. Pakistan's role was to act as a bridge between the Taliban government and the international community on pointing out the different problematic areas specially the violation of human rights was a point of concern. The destruction of Buddah statue in Bamyan was considered as an attack and intolerance towards other religions which was at the same time tarnishing the image of the Muslim countries. It was an unfortunate state of affairs for Pakistan that its struggles did not bring any fruitful result for both sides. Pakistan's expectations from Taliban government as regarding the latter internal and external policies became all in vain. Pakistan failed to persuade the international community on Taliban issue in Afghanistan as most of the countries had

¹ Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier", *International Security* Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring, 2008), The MIT Press p. 41

² <http://www.dawn.com/news/1148914> accessed on 30/3/2015

withheld recognition to the regime. Pakistan was in a chaotic situation due to the Osama Bin Laden factor in Afghanistan. He settled down in Afghanistan and was suspected to have been involved in terrorist activities against the US³.

Two days before 9/11, the Pakistani Foreign Minister said that Pakistan enjoys good relations with Kabul and sanctions on Afghanistan are not acceptable.⁴ Pakistan believed in supporting the Afghan government and the sanctions imposed by UNO should be reduced so that there is peace in Afghanistan.

9/11 and change in the politics of the region

For attacking US on 11th September 2001, the terrorist chose four targets well-known to the globe as obvious signs of USA's respect and supremacy. The leading two symbols representing the financial power of United States were in New York, the two towers of World Trade Centre. The third target of attack was the Pentagon which signified US military capability. The fourth plane which was hijacked, crashed in Pennsylvania and its selected highest value target was most probably Washington or the White House which escaped the attack luckily. The rest of the three hijacked planes successfully carried out their mission and created chaos and destruction in the two buildings causing numerous deaths. The hijackers had been planning to carry out these attacks months back and had received training for this purpose.⁵

9/11 shaped a new worldwide go-ahead that pursued to de-legitimize any political fierceness directed at citizens, regardless of circumstance and reluctance to differentiate this from resistance to state intimidation or external occupation.⁶

After 9/11 there was absence of assurance and conviction in Islamabad. The administration desired to keep all parties predicting and contented. Two Pakistani delegations toured Kandahar demanding Mullah Omer to take suitable steps to diffuse the state of affairs. Mullah Omer's teacher formed a part of goodwill delegation from Pakistan.⁷

The spokesperson of the Foreign Office acknowledged that mutually Afghan ulema and headship had reaffirmed their promise to the defense, security as well as cohesiveness of the two adjoining republics. Together the parties decided to have interaction with each other in addition to that another consultation might take place if the need was felt. The Taliban as well as their followers had slight thoughtfulness of the progresses around them. They had no idea on the subject of the safety perils to Pakistan. They were receiving incorrect signals from the power circles in the Pakistani capital city of Islamabad. Pakistan sustained its struggle to involve the Taliban administration but simultaneously was swift to ban Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. Pakistan was unable to manage its Afghan strategy internationally and in the domestic sphere. The terrorist took part in fratricidal murders and had no broad-mindedness. They killed a number of extremely competent teachers, engineers, physicians, bureaucrats and innocent individuals at worship places.⁸

³ Dr. Irum Khalid, *Pakistan Foreign Policy* (Lahore: Peace Publications, 2013) pp. 264, 265

⁴ Farooq Hasnat, *Pakistan Unresolved Issues of State and Society* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2008) pp. 266

⁵ <http://books.google.com.pk/books?id=wfhI5oc41sMC&printsec=frontcover&dq=9/11&hl=en&sa=X&ei=aECBVJ-dFoPtO9z2gegF&ved=0CDgQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=9%2F11&f=false> accessed on 1/4/14

⁶ Dr. Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, *Contemporary Geopolitics: Afghanistan and Pakistan* (Lahore: Department of Persian, 2013) p. 305

⁷ Farooq Hasnat, op.cit, 2008. pp. 269-270

⁸ Ibid., pp. 271-272

After the occurrence of 9/11, President Bush acknowledged that bombing on Pentagon and World Trade Centre were actions of confrontation. Four weeks later US and UK began severe targeting of Afghanistan from the air and by means of backing of Northern Alliance, they crushed the Taliban administration. Several thousand Taliban and Al-Qaeda associates were murdered between October 7, 2001 and March 17, 2002 in the Operation Enduring Freedom.⁹

The announcement about War on Terrorism was hasty, perilous and dynamic. It aimed at the elimination of Al-Qaeda as well as its chief facilitators, the Afghan Taliban regime. The incident of 9/11 changed the environment and Pakistan owing to its geo-strategic location and cultural similarity of its tribal regions with that of Pashtuns predominantly the Afghan Taliban turn out to be the vanguard state for USA as it made up its mind to turn into a companion in its war against terrorism.

Pakistan had to go against Taliban, its close former associates. This modification in foreign strategy towards Afghanistan was not appreciated by the right-wing devotees of Taliban in Pakistan. This gave rise to a sort of armed revolt contrary to the new strategy of the administration in a few regions of the republic.¹⁰

Musharraf was unable to discontinue dealings with Taliban instantaneously and ambassadorial dealings were retained until the regime collapsed in November through a Taliban ambassador-cleric based in Islamabad. This Afghan regime's representative availed full advantage of the curiosity of the world's media to spread the announcement that Taliban would by no means betray Al-Qaeda. When it turned out to be apparent that the administration, the former diplomat claimed to represent had ended, he was denied refuge in Pakistan and deported to Guantanamo Bay.¹¹

Pakistan opened its flight exclusion zone to US airplanes for armed maneuvers in Afghanistan, and allowed approval to the US to use three minor landing strips in Sindh and Baluchistan for logistical, communication and backup support for US fighting tasks in Afghanistan. The armed and intelligence experts of the two states shared intelligence on fanatic groups and their undertakings in Afghanistan and Pakistan. US security and intelligence employees directed combined acts in Pakistan with Pakistani safety and intelligence organizations against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban fundamentals that covertly crossed the thresholds of Pakistan after being displaced from Afghanistan. The US armed establishment and the Afghan administration impressed on the Pakistani establishment to eject the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fundamentals who took sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal regions after getting involved in violent undertakings in Afghanistan.

Pakistan forwarded its armed forces to the tribal regions in June 2003, which from time-to-time started maneuvers against ex-Afghan fighters in the tribal regions. The US responded by removing economic sanctions against Pakistan in October-November 2001 and took paces to revive two-pronged relations in numerous arenas of common concern, comprising the economy, trade and investment, socio-economic growth and military progress. Direct US help to Pakistan concentrated on financial sustenance, mechanical assistance, better line of work, economic and mechanical sustenance for numerous subdivisions like wellbeing of its citizens, learning, nutrition, social equality advancement,

⁹ Oded Lowenheim, *Predators and Parasites* (Michigan: The University of Michigan, 2007) p. 175

¹⁰ Dr. Umbreen Javaid, *Pakistan Fights Extremism and Terrorism* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Private Limited, 2013) pp. 51, 52

¹¹ Hilary Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan Ways Out of Instability* (Oxon: Routledge 2009) p. 66

child labor eradication and counter-narcotics. The US protracted monetary and technological help to reinforce border safety (mainly Pakistan-Afghanistan border), capability building for dealing with law-and-order conditions and particularly extremism, upgrading of communication and road construction in the tribal regions and better enlisting and control of individuals leaving or entering the country through different entry-exit points. The US financial support for the period of 2002-2003 comprised US \$600 million as economic provision and over US \$455 million for different growth programmers. Likewise, Pakistan also received compensation for the use of Pakistani facilities by US troops.

Security aspect in Pakistan Afghanistan relations

The security relations between the two states are of foremost importance since the independence of Pakistan. Both the states need to have secure borders to avoid the infiltration of insurgent elements and avoid interference in each other's matters. This commitment has been violated many times by both the states in order to pursue their own interests.

Throughout the Cold War the opponents of USA, supported their particular groups in Afghanistan for their tactical importance, which drove the state to its armed and economic misfortunes. The Soviet assault of Afghanistan in 1979 was credited as the foremost reason of Afghan reliance on United States' support. CIA organized the movement of large supplies of ammunitions and weapons, cash as well as other prerequisites of confrontation into Afghanistan by arranging drills for Afghan freedom fighters and leading campaigns of surprise attack, break-ins and missile outbreaks on the Soviet. Afghanistan has occupied a significant position in the perception of American military organizers, where the gamble of victory of USA multidimensional plan for South Asia, Central Asia, China and West Asia remained high in comparison to any republic in Asia.

The similar feature brought Soviet Union into Afghanistan in addition the strong desire to spread their impact in Afghanistan made the state a permanent theatre of conflict.¹²

Afghanistan oscillated between two power blocs for their premeditated concerns for almost two and a half decades. It turns out to be the last battleground that pitted USSR against western power throughout the Cold War. The USSR army faced humiliation in its Afghan venture which finished with its departure in 1989 and accelerated the disappointment in Soviet political research, leading to the starting of new episode of American power and progression towards a new international structure.¹³

When the Russians left this region Afghanistan faced internal problems which lead to the emergence of Taliban. Pakistan supported the regime with the hope that it would provide security benefits and isolated its adversary, India. Pakistani officials actively participated to keep the Taliban strong footed in Afghanistan.

Pakistani airliner aided with troop replacements of Taliban militaries in the course of fighting actions in late 2000 and that high-ranking associate of Pakistan's intelligence organization and defense forces were involved in scheduling foremost Taliban armed

¹² Omer Farooq Zain, "Afghanistan from Conflict to Conflict" Pakistan Horizon Volume 59, No.1 (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2006) p. 82

¹³ Ibid., p. 79

actions. This did not end there Pakistan was also providing the Taliban government with fighting equipment.

Daily almost 30 trucks were crossing the borders of Pakistan in April and May 2001. A number of these convoys were conveying rocket-propelled bombs, missiles explosives, and tank rounds. These transferences were clear violation of U.N.O endorsements. Pakistan had setup landmines in Afghanistan; they comprised of both anti-vehicle and antipersonnel pits.

On 3rd May 2001, in a public statement the interior minister of Pakistan denied that Pakistan was equipping Afghanistan with any funds or weapons. He reaffirmed his administration's stance that Afghanistan was an autonomous republic over which Pakistan exercised no control. On the record Pakistan refuted its interference in Afghanistan however behind the scene things were happening the other way.¹⁴

9/11 changed the security paradigm of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. It provided US the opportunity to attack Afghanistan and eliminate the Al-Qaeda forces. In 2001 the American annexation made Afghanistan a territory of apparently endless chaos and continuous disaster. The pro-US administration of Afghanistan was incompetent to decide the prospect of the country as it nosedived to gain the confidence of the public. The government was under challenge from independent warlords, poppy producers, smugglers and ousted Taliban guerrillas who the government claimed were jumping into the fray with external support allegedly from Pakistan. The US viewed Afghanistan as a base camp of Islamic resurgence and was not ready for a pull-out until Afghanistan was completely democratized or secularized. True to its tradition of duplicity the US was playing a dubious role in Afghan affairs. In order to ward off any potential threat from the former Taliban elements, the US followed a policy of divide and control by harboring criminals and anti-Taliban warlords on one hand, and promoting minority groups for a stable democracy in Afghanistan on the other. For the Afghans it was indeed a turning point in their long struggle against the external interventions which deprived them from freedom.¹⁵

The event of 9/11 and the attack on Afghanistan by the US forces changed the nature of relationship between the two States as the Government of Northern Alliance was installed which openly expressed a change in tone at various occasions and platforms.

On 29th June 2002 in Washington, Afghan Defense Minister General Mohammad Qasim Fahim objected to contracting a safety accord with Pakistan to increase the combat against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban operators. In August 2002 Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah demanded Pakistan to halt its intelligence organizations from assisting Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. The two Afghan spokesperson were critical of Pakistan for its part in favor of condemned Taliban that only brought despair and devastation to Afghanistan through butcheries and detachments among ethnic groups. This behavior of Afghan leaders reflected that they were not willing to trust Pakistan.¹⁶

During the first seven to eight months of 2002, random ferocious happenings befell in the hilly border regions of eastern and south-eastern Afghanistan and violence of Bagrami district (Kabul) in August. These occurrences were credited to fragments of Taliban and Al-Qaeda which had been incapable or reluctant to escape to Pakistan and were perceived

¹⁴ <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm> accessed on 20-2-15

¹⁵ <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1686268/Afghanistan-War> accessed on 11/4/15

¹⁶ ed. Bharat Verma, Indian Defence Review July-September 2002 Vol.17 (3), New Delhi: Lancer Publisher and Distributor pp. 126,127

as primarily struggling for existence. In September 2002 improved well thought-out struggles to flare up a large-scale uprising started. An enrolment initiative was stated to be successful in Pakistan and Afghanistan while publicity fact sheet was circulated in the rural community and the first preparation headquarters were being established in Pakistani territory. Afghan safety posts on the Pakistani border of the Southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand were frequently attacked. This indicated that the Taliban were resurfacing again in Afghanistan.¹⁷

In the meanwhile, Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders took refuge in the Northern areas of Pakistan as the US bombing had made their survival and re-organization difficult. So Pakistani army had to take action against them. In pursuit of Al Qaeda operatives the armed forces of Pakistan progressed into parts of FATA in 2002.¹⁸

On the nightfall of 25th June 2002, Operation Kazha Punga was led in South Waziristan region. Evidence about the existence of 30 to 35 Al-Qaeda members and their relatives was received. A strength of 500 covering components of the Special Services Group the consistent infantry and the Frontier Corps were instantaneously forwarded to that region. The extremist begged innocence and asked the troops to examine the compound. Ten soldiers lost their life and two terrorists were slain and others ran away. It verified the existence of foreign radicals beyond the Tora Bora region and that they were getting native help. Fresh force was trained and intelligence system was created on ground in addition dozens of trivial actions were carried out against famous Al-Qaeda targets however in most of the circumstances the evidence was inadequate or late and the forces were sluggish than Al-Qaeda.¹⁹

Arresting of its operatives also began in Pakistani cities because Pakistan had agreed to support US in its efforts to curtail radicalism. United States interrogated the arrested suspects which were handed over to them

Pakistan at the same time made up its mind to eliminate the misunderstanding in the perception of Afghan rulers.

On December 22, 2002 Pakistan contracted the affirmation on Good Neighborly Relations with Afghanistan and its adjoining republics in Kabul. The Declaration reiterates the neighboring states' pledge to non-interference in the interior matters of Afghanistan as well as their determination to defeat narco-traffic, fanaticism and radicalism. Khurshid Kasuri, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, toured to the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul to sign the declaration. It revealed Pakistan's assurance for harmony in the region. It similarly exhibited the Afghan administration's understanding that these matters were a serious apprehension for its safety and cannot be resolved without the collaboration of regional countries.²⁰

Side by side Pakistan also intensified its efforts to capture more terrorist and planned operations were conducted. In the first week of October 2003, Operation Baghar China executed 8 extremist and detained 19. Counter insurrection maneuver was directed in the South Waziristan agency from March 16th to 28th, 2004. Indigenous populace was approached through their Jirga demanding them to hand over all non-nationals. The

¹⁷ Antonio Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop* (London: Hurst Publishers Limited, 2007) pp. 2,3

¹⁸ www.understandingwar.org/pakistan-and-afghanistan accessed on 23-2-15

¹⁹ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire* (London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2006) pp. 267, 268

²⁰ Pakistan Foreign Relations (Islamabad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002) pp. 8,9

reaction of Jirga was optimistic but the non-nationals rejected to reach a decision. An action was initiated through the Frontier Corps however they were trapped in a cunningly arranged surprise outbreak therefore the defense force was approached to breakdown the entrapment and release the restrained males of Frontier constabulary. Shakai Valley Operation was started on 10th June, 2004. Division of Bosh Narai, Sangtoi and Mangtoi were likewise unoccupied after their efforts. The Shakai agreement was contracted with Waziri clan and the Pakistani regime for progress. An aerial shelling was thrust in the region of Mahsud clan mainly in Dila Khula on 9th September, 2004. Killing of foreign terrorists in the tribal areas confirmed the presence of extremist in the border areas of Pakistan and beyond and there was a need to address the issue of cross-border infiltration of terrorist.²¹

Pakistan Afghanistan and the US government decided to cooperate in order to improve security condition in the region and to secure the porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In June 2003 a Tripartite Commission was created to address joint fears linked to terrorist actions in the restless border regions. The Commission brought together high-ranking military and ambassadorial officers from USA, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Up to June 30, 2004 it organized seven consultations and established two sub-committees on Border Posts and Military Information Exchange and Planning. The Commission had been operating reasonably in agreement with its decree.²²

Afghanistan and Pakistan were allies in the combat against extremism. Improved harmonization and collaboration among the two adjacent countries was the greatest assurance for regional safety.

In Rawalpindi on 24th August 2005, during the 12th meeting of the TPC held at GHQ, it was raised to the level of 4-Star Generals. The Commander of the Afghan National Army, General Bismullah Khan toured Rawalpindi in August 2005, and came again in April 2006. NATO was officially applauded into the Commission's fold as a full participant in June 2006. These commissions reflected the desire of both Pakistan and Afghanistan to curb militancy in the region.²³

The Administration of Pakistan gave fourteen Taliban captives to the Government of Afghanistan in October 2005. Pakistani security forces were working actively to protect the internal security of the state against such outlaws. Their effort did not stop and continued with unwavering determination despite the fact that they were facing fierce retaliation from the Taliban.²⁴

The Tripartite Commission held three gatherings, the last being held in Rawalpindi in January 2007. The participation of US in the commission is evidence that border security will not be tightened unless US proposes concrete measures and provide technological assistance to both the states to overcome this issue.²⁵

An American soldier under NATO command was shot and killed by Pakistani FC fighter in May 2007 exactly after a TPC gathering that had been organized with the purpose of averting Pakistan Afghanistan border clashes. Pakistani administrators laid the guilt of the

²¹ Pervez Musharraf, op.cit, 2006. p. 269

²² Pakistan Foreign Relations (Islamabad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003-2004) pp. 11,12

²³ Pakistan Foreign Office Year Book 2005-2006 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan p.13

²⁴ Pakistan and the World (Chronology: October-December 2005), Pakistan Horizon Volume 59 No.1 (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, January 2006) p.87

²⁵ Foreign Office Year Book 2006-2007 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan. p.14

occurrence on troublemakers which the US and Afghan sources were hesitant to agree with. Pakistan threatened to challenge the commission and in February 2008 Pakistan stopped joining the commission gatherings. NATO, ISAF and Afghanistan stood on one side and Pakistan on the other. They accused Pakistan for generating turbulence in Afghanistan. The US Defense spokespersons stated that in June 2008 meetings restarted. In late June 2008, Pakistan and NATO representatives approved to re-establish the commission, during ISAF Commander General David McKiernan's first tour to Pakistan after assuming control of ISAF.²⁶

In order to eradicate the fundamentals that confront the authority of Pakistani government, in Swat valley the first phase of Operation Rah-e-Haq began in November 2007. The military claimed to have executed scores of radicals and to have extricated them from their headquarters. Nonetheless, assaults on the security forces continued, bringing about the regime to sign a ceasefire with Fazlullah in May 2008.

Strains appeared for a second time once Fazlullah's men declined to lay down their weapons and pressed for the departure of military troops from Swat as a pre-condition for valuing the May 2008 contract. In July 2008 this compelled the Pakistani Armed forces to start the next stage of Operation Rah-e-Haq.²⁷

Even though cooperation and commissions were being setup to address the issue of security the trust deficit between the Afghanistan and Pakistan existed. Both the States continued to blame each other for the mis-happenings in their country and interference in the internal matters.

Dealings were strained when President Hamid Karzai associated Pakistan in an elimination shot on him in 2008 and threatened to chase Taliban forces into Pakistan. In early 2008, with an effort to increase border safety, the first of six minor U.S-Afghan-Pakistani border safety posts was opened on the Afghanistan-Pakistan boundary. It was hoped by taking such initiatives terrorist attacks would reduce in Pakistan and Afghanistan and cross-border infiltration would minimize which would decrease support to the terrorists.²⁸

Security conditions in Afghanistan were quite weak because the Afghan security forces lacked modern training and equipment to counter the terrorists. The Afghan security forces were attacked by Taliban members. Around 1,100 prisoners escaped from Sarposa Prison in Kandahar after an attack by the Taliban in 2008. It became easier for the Afghan government to blame Pakistan for their security lapses, as little effort was made by Kabul administration to establish its control in areas that were beyond the city of Kabul.²⁹

Bajaur Agency had existed as the stronghold of rebellious frontrunners such as Faqir Muhammad and Zia-ur-Rahman, both of whom were assumed to have kept relations with al-Qa'ida. In August 2008, to counter the Pakistani Taliban in Bajaur, Pakistan's security forces started Operation Sherdil. The maneuver compelled thousands of residents to flee

²⁶https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=FW4Cx75_7usC&pg=PA155&lpg=PA155&dq=tripartite+commission+afghanistan+pakistan+US&source=bl&ots=KiFLc3Ay96&sig=ib45KAFUFSZu9XjDZPI-hhmLG48&hl=en&sa=X&ei=3aybVZCND8WwUZaStrgL&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=tripartite%20commission%20afghanistan%20pakistan%20US&f=false accessed on 12/1/15

²⁷ <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/evaluating-pakistan%E2%80%99s-offensives-in-swat-and-fata> accessed on 12/7/15

²⁸ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/forrel.htm> accessed on 20/2/15

²⁹ Syed Farooq Hasnat, *Global Security Watch Pakistan* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012) p. 180

the region and strive for shelter in temporary encampments in other cities. The defence force announced victory in February 2009, publicising that more than 1,000 rebels had been exterminated.³⁰

In the meanwhile, the Pakistani Military initiated an action in South Waziristan Agency against TTP dominant Hakimullah Mehsud, who was blameable for the widely held suicide and other outbreaks in FATA and Pakistani cities. On October 17, 2009 the manoeuvre mainly started and was named Rah-e-Nijat. Pakistan's security services claimed to mete out heavy losses on South Waziristan's rebels, disturbing their command-and-control scheme.³¹

The Afghan border forces meddled into Pakistan in the Zhob area and slayed three Pakistanis in January 2010. Afghan armed forces had desecrated the Pakistani boundary in the past too and countless human lives had been lost. Only diplomatic protests were registered and nothing concrete could be done to stop such activities.³²

On January 23, 2010 the Tripartite Commission comprising high-ranking armed officials from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, arranged its 30th meeting in Rawalpindi. Delegations were headed by Director Operations of Afghan National Army who was Lieutenant General Sher Muhammad Karimi, Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani and ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) Commander General Stanley McChrystal. The meeting appraised the safety condition in regions along the Pak- Afghan Border and talked over actions to increase the efficiency of continuing maneuvers in the border areas. The members presented approval in the current level of collaboration. The Al-Qaeda and Taliban members were posing serious internal security threats. At the 31st Tripartite Commission meeting of armed representatives in Kabul, Pakistan's General Kayani met President Karzai of Afghanistan as well as other officers like Chief of General Staff Sher Muhammad Karimi of Afghan National Army and ISAF Commander Gen. Petraeus. They talked about the new counter-terrorism strategy for the region. Pakistan acknowledged the Kabul plan of Hamid Karzai which recommended peace-making with the Taliban. In September 2010 all the highest armed and ambassadorial agents of Pakistan, Afghanistan and United States Commander Gen. Petraeus took part in the gathering to talk about the war circumstances and the Afghan rapprochement proposal. There was a realization among the member states that the Afghan crisis could not be solved without negotiating with the Taliban.³³

On July 20, 2010 Pakistan also protracted complete backing to the objectives of Kabul Conference. The opportunity was hosted by the government of Afghanistan and co-chaired by the UNO. The joint working assembly established by Pakistan, Turkey and Afghanistan shared their sentiments on the significance of the Kabul Conference by recognizing the struggle.³⁴

³⁰ <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/evaluating-pakistan%E2%80%99s-offensives-in-swat-and-fata> accessed on 12/7/15

³¹ <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/evaluating-pakistan%E2%80%99s-offensives-in-swat-and-fata> accessed on 14/4/15

³² <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-6-203769-Pakistan-Afghanistan-relations-and-future-course> accessed on 17/4/15

³³ "Kayani meets Karzai, discusses anti-terrorism strategy", The Daily Times, Lahore 8 October 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\08\10\story_10-8-2010_pg7_7.

³⁴ "Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan discuss Kabul conference results", worldbulletin.net, 20 July 2010, http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=61561

To overcome the recent volcanic mess of insurrection both Pakistan and Afghanistan had a common methodology on solving the dispute. Both were steadfast to bringing the guerrillas to the negotiating table through administrative scheme to end the hostilities. President Karzai and Pakistani institutions, in cooperation as well as individually, were making efforts in their own ways for urging hard-core fundamentals to abandon insurrection. It was hoped that by these efforts' terrorists' attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan would decrease when they would be given concessions by the government of both countries.

Pakistan demonstrated eagerness to act as a mediator in a deal between the Taliban and the administration of Hamid Karzai. Pakistan assumed the role of becoming a negotiator by eradicating divergences between the administration of Afghanistan and Haqqani group. Afghan President Karzai had been struggling to communicate with the Haqqani network in 2007 and 2009 but to no benefit. The militant organization of Jalaluddin Haqqani did not participate in the Jirga for reconciliation. The organization mostly operates in the provinces of Paktika, Khost and Paktia. The al-Qaeda associated Haqqani group was regarded as a main threat by both the administration of Karzai as well as the USA government in Afghanistan. The administrators of Pakistan were reluctant to discuss the issue in depth on the other hand influential officials declared that preliminary contacts had been created with Sirajuddin Haqqani and other prime candidates of the organization through negotiation. The debates for an administrative settlement between the Haqqani network and the Afghan government could be initiated. The representatives likewise announced that the headship of the Haqqani network appeared to be enthusiastic to have a conversation with the Kabul administration.³⁵

On January 26th and 27th 2010, at the NATO commander-in-chief's meeting in Brussels Gen. Kayani proposed to organize the ANA (Afghan National Army) where the Taliban troops opting for ceasefire would be assimilated. The arrangement was intended to cultivate relations among the two republics besides helping Afghanistan to turn out to be stable. The central idea was that by extending training to the military, Pak-Afghan collaboration level would upsurge which would boost mutual understanding, leading to merger of benefits.³⁶ Both the Afghan administration and the Afghan Taliban had in the beginning disqualified Pakistan's mediatory role from the appeasement process, even though the decision was changed shortly later due to the capture of Mullah Baradar, second in rank to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. President Karzai and high-ranking Afghan armed officers blamed Pakistan for disturbing the peace process when the Pakistani establishments with CIA's backing arrested Mullah Baradar.³⁷

High-ranking Afghan officers condemned Pakistan for blocking the procedure at a critical time when they were covertly in connection with Mullah Baradar who was enthusiastic to play a part in the grand jirga. In Afghanistan it is assumed that Mullah Baradar had agreed

³⁵ www.irs.org.pk/afghanistan/spn10.doc accessed on 20/12/14

³⁶ "Pakistan's defense strategy remains unchanged", Strategic Thinking and Policy Institute, 2 February 2010, <http://stapins.org/2010/02/02/pakistans-defense-strategy-remains-unchanged/>.

³⁷ Joshua Partlow and Karen DeYoung, "Afghan officials say Pakistan's arrest of Taliban leader threatens peace talks", The Washington Post, 10 April 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/09/AR2010040904807.html?hpid=topnews>.

to join the Afghan peace procedure individually without Pakistan's direction and was of no use for the ISI so Pakistan detained him.

The Afghan government was under pressure and could not energetically follow its reconciliatory strategy without Pakistan's role. The Taliban were careful of Pakistani tactics and were not at all times willing to accept any crucial role for Pakistan in their country. Pakistan's change of direction in backing up foreigners against Taliban provoked their aggression. A few of their top representatives were in custody of Pakistan and handed over to the USA. Taliban desired to make judgements themselves in future devoid of the participation of any external player.³⁸

On 23rd December, 2010 Sher Mohammed Karimi, Afghan Chief of General Staff, organized a consultation of Pakistan-Afghanistan-ISAF Tripartite Commission in Kabul for the exchange of ideas over the security settings in Pakistan and Afghanistan in addition to abilities for forthcoming group struggle as both states pursue to work upon safety enhancements in 2010.

The key participants were Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, General Karimi, Commander of ISAF Gen. David Petraeus and the leading dynamic planners from each army component.

Ever since 2003 these deliberations were the 32nd. In 2011, in addition to the considerations on potential extents for security co-operation, the group likewise communicated the significances of the Pakistan-Afghanistan USA Strategic Review and the Lisbon Summit, innovative progress in restoration of compatible fundamentalist of Afghan uprising, Pakistani initiatives to work upon its counterinsurgency efforts in the past 22 months and methods in which security cooperation and setup improvements might increase trade and business expansion.

Gen. Petraeus reported that according to the participants this was the most fruitful of the past 31 gatherings. The cooperation will continue with consultations of active organizers in future.

The participants accepted that the responsibilities in the region were multidimensional for one specific government to solve so coordinated action was required for building the relevant accomplishments in both states.³⁹

Osama bin Laden was killed in his compound in Abbottabad on 1st May, 2011 by a raiding mission of seventy-nine Navy SEALs who entered Pakistan by a helicopter and dumped his body in the sea. This operation was named "Operation Geronimo". The killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan was a serious blow to the credibility of Pakistani armed forces and they were accused of providing shelter to the terrorist. The armed forces and the government condemned the action of US as it violated the sovereignty of Pakistan without informing the top officials of the country and launched an attack covertly.⁴⁰

On July 6, 2011 a gathering of the tripartite commission's military border committee was set up in Peshawar on Pakistan's demand. The working group recommended the formation of a single point of interaction with all Afghan national security forces via hotline interaction between the Pakistan Army and Afghan National Army, systematic border flag

³⁸ www.irs.org.pk/afghanistan/spn10.doc accessed on 20/12/14

³⁹ <http://www.rs.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/afghan-chief-of-general-staff-hosts-tripartite-commission-in-kabul.html> accessed on 8/7/15

⁴⁰ <http://books.google.com.pk/books?id=QX8DAQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=9/11&hl=en&sa=X&ei=aECBVJ-dFoPtO9z2gegF&ved=0CBoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=9%2F11&f=false> accessed 4/8/15

consultations amid native chiefs and communication/jirgas between the maliks of rural community on one or the other side of the boundary. Nonetheless all these endeavors had nosedived to discover a feasible mechanism, which had encouraged the radicals to wander without obstruction across the boundary and launch assaults on both sides of the boundary.⁴¹

The Afghan people are worried about bordering states presence in Afghanistan. They want the regional players to work with the Afghan administration without getting involved enthusiastically in the state. They have understood that the involvement of foreign hands in creating Afghanistan a mess. They are tired of wars and want to have peace and prosperity in their country.

The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan do not remain normal for long especially in terms of border disputes and security parameters. In August 2012, security recruits from both states entered a two-hour-long clash, which had produced no wounded person nonetheless tense dealings among the two republics surfaced once again.

Afghanistan and Pakistan usually accuse each other for violence by Taliban fighters troubling both sides of their boundary, identified as the Durand Line.⁴²

A change in strategy with respect to dealing with the Taliban was seen. The Pakistani administration permitted in August 2012, the spokespersons of the Afghan administration with access to Baradar reflecting a readiness to participate in reconciliation dialogues in expectation of US disappearance from the area. There had also been other peace proposals among the two republics, mostly assisted by the US. There was a growing realization between the two states that the blame game was of no use it only encouraged the terrorists to carry on their destructive activities without complication.⁴³

In November 2012, United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan contracted an essential document – Tripartite Border Coordination Mechanism – to increase liaison alongside the border amongst their troops and build up counter-terrorism collaboration. At the Defense Ministry of Afghanistan in Kabul the 36th gathering of Tripartite Commission (TPC) was prearranged. The conference was structured under the banner of “Tripartite Coordination Mechanism” and involvement of General Sher Muhammad Karimi of Afghanistan, temporary Commander of ISAF Lieutenant General Nicholas Carter and Pakistani Gen Ashfaq Kayani along with their associates were seen. Participants studied the contemporary combat maneuvers in Afghanistan and bordering Pakistani tribal areas. The three members agreed to continue collaboration for long-standing co-ordination, success and steadiness on both verges of the boundary. Gen Ashfaq Kayani called on President Karzai before the meeting of TPC at the Presidential Palace. Matters of mutual distress were communicated by both the rulers.⁴⁴

In December 2012 to remove misunderstandings between the Pakistani and Afghan government, Hina Rabbani Khar, in discussions with her Afghan equivalent, dismissed any idea that Pakistan desired to have an influence in Afghanistan in reply to President Karzai's

⁴¹ <http://www.dawn.com/news/683155/strategic-sensitivities> accessed on 8/7/15

⁴² <http://www.dawn.com/news/1104129> accessed on 24-2-15

⁴³ <http://islamopediaonline.org/country-profile/pakistan/transnational-influences-and-militancy/relations-afghanistan> accessed on 23-2-15

⁴⁴ <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/11/21/national/tripartite-commission-signs-agreement-for-better-border-coordination/> accessed on 3/7/15

appeal in October for Pakistan to halt its role in Afghanistan's devastation. Pakistan was more interested in dealing with the terrorist residing in Pakistan and their capture. Pakistan had suffered a lot due to this menace of terrorism and wanted to bring peace in the region.⁴⁵ Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar said during her discussions with the Afghan Foreign Minister, that they had decided to hold a meeting of Pakistani and Afghan ulema by the end of January 2013, discharge of convicts and to move onward on the question of dialogues with Taliban. This reflected Pakistan's commitment to bring peace in the region and to solve issues of mutual discord amicably.⁴⁶

Indian factor in Pakistan Afghanistan relations

The relations between Afghanistan and India had been cordial since 1947 because both did not have smooth relations with Pakistan. Afghanistan did not support Pakistan on the Kashmir issue despite being a Muslim State and raised Pakhtoonistan problem instead. It opposed Pakistan's entry in the UN and the Indians had supported Afghans to create problems for Pakistan particularly by supporting the dissident elements in Pakistan's border regions with Afghanistan.

India was an ally of the USSR as well as the Afghan communist regime. As soon as the Mujahideen and later the Taliban seized power their political existence in Kabul finished. There was no Indian existence in Afghanistan during the course of the 1990's.

After 9/11 the Indians discovered its non-Pushtun supporters within the administration. In the civil war, India had helped the Northern Alliance and was passionate to accept the government of Hamid Karzai. It also established numerous followers among sophisticated and liberal Pushtuns who were weary of Taliban power and rejected them. India promptly established an extraordinarily well calculated support package sponsoring just about US\$ 1.2 billion that promoted Indian ventures and generosity across all racial groups, organized the conveyance facility in Kabul, erected significant infrastructure schemes as well as financed noteworthy communal agendas like health. In contrast to Western relief organizations, around 80 percent of Indian currency was in reality consumed on developments as Indian NGO's had little expenses.⁴⁷

India also granted 500 yearly scholarships for Afghan students, facility of vocational training activities for women, construction of dams and a new Afghan Parliament house was also built.⁴⁸

The Indian government helped the Afghans in developing agriculture, telecommunication, education and electricity facility. The Indian government hired medical staff to support in philanthropic work in Afghanistan. It has established medical missions in the important Afghan cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Jalalabad. (See appendix II) Indian experts have helped Afghanistan on the issues of sanitation, irrigation and renewable energy ventures. India provided training to Afghan diplomats, doctors, lawyers, judges, teachers and women entrepreneurs. India also contracted a Preferential Trade Agreement with Afghanistan to boost trade and improve economy in 2003.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ <http://www.dawn.com/news/785279/an-afghan-sojourn> accessed on 24-2-15

⁴⁶ <http://www.dawn.com/news/768088/pakistan-seeking-responsible-us-exit-from-afghanistan-khar> accessed on 24-2-15

⁴⁷ Maliha Lodhi, *Pakistan Beyond the Crisis State* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011) pp. 315-316

⁴⁸ ed. David Scott, *Handbook of India's International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2011) p. 109

⁴⁹ Arijit Muzamdar, *Indian Foreign Policy in Transition* (New York: Routledge, 2013) pp. 67,68

Information existing with Asian Development Bank indicated that India stood at the third position accounting for eight percent in standings of Afghan imports, though Pakistan accounted for twenty-nine percent. In terms of Afghan exports India categorized at third place in 2003 with nineteen percent imports from Afghanistan as compared to twenty-two percent from Pakistan. Pakistan permitted the transportation of Afghan merchandises to India over its territory but not vice versa in its effort to check Indian impact in Afghanistan.⁵⁰

India re-started its consulate in Kabul shortly after the Taliban's overthrow. It similarly opened four Consular Offices in main Afghan cities of Mazar-Sharif, Herat, Qandahar and Jalalabad. In the past India never had any Consular Offices in these cities particularly the ones close to Pakistan's border raised suspicions in the mind of the Pakistani officials.

India was shocked by the prospect of Taliban's return to power (which would end its strategic advantages in Afghanistan) and wishes to revive Northern Alliance and others opposed to accommodation with the Taliban. Return of Taliban in power would isolate India once again.

The India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership was the first official mutual agreement with a foreign government for the modernization of the state contracted in October 2011. New Delhi, agreeing to the Indo-Afghan tactical partnership, had already decided to support Afghan National Security Forces in establishment and equipment line-ups. On the other hand, it is worth observing that the problems in Afghanistan were due to the threat perceptions in the mind of the Indo-Pak leaders. Each wanted to use Afghanistan in such a way so as to put pressure and make each other insecure.⁵¹

Supply route for NATO forces

International troops were sent to Afghanistan by the Western military coalition NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) when the Taliban were overthrown in 2001 succeeding the 9/11 assaults in the United States. There were just above 50,000 NATO troops servicing in Afghanistan from 49 contributing countries.⁵²

Afghanistan is a non-coastal country and in order to put up with huge foreign militaries in the region, provisions must pass through other states to reach Afghanistan or it can be conveyed by air which is costly hence NATO forces hinge on land routes for non-lethal equipment. Goods were shipped by sea to Karachi port of Pakistan. One route supply in the north and the other in south of Afghanistan. The Pakistani route provide fuel for NATO. The military was consuming 575000 gallons of fuel in a day in 2007, and 80 percent of fuel came from Pakistani processing plant. The fuel storing capability for forces at Bagram and Kabul air bases was less than 3 million gallons, making NATO struggles extremely in need of the Pakistani supply routes. NATO started working to lessen this dependence, constructing an additional 3 million gallons of storage space at Bagram Air Base in fall 2007.⁵³

⁵⁰ Zahid Shahab Ahmed & Stuti Bhatnagar, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations and the Indian Factor" Pakistan Horizon, Volume 60, No.2 (Pakistan Foreign Policy Analysis April 2007) Pakistan Institute of International Affairs pp.167,168

⁵¹ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-03-300514.html accessed on 4/3/15

⁵² <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11371138> accessed on 9/4/15

⁵³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_logistics_in_the_Afghan_War accessed on 30/8/14

90 percent of fighting necessities in 2008, assured for ISAF were unloaded at Karachi port and sent by truck to Afghanistan. For this purpose, two paths were taken of which one road passed through Baluchistan and Quetta, roaming through the Khojak Pass and the Pakistani border towns of Chaman and Afghan region of Spin Boldak leading to Kandahar. 75 percent of the coalition goods were transported using the other path starting from Karachi to Peshawar and through FATA's Khyber Agency to the border areas of Torkham (Afghanistan), reaching Jalalabad and Kabul at the end. The supplies were generally non-combat items like fuel, drinking liquids, eatables and building provisions, conveyed by road while army equipment and other delicate devices were flown in by consignment aircraft.

In Peshawar and Pakistan's north-western areas warehouses and stock convoys were attacked by Pakistani Taliban or groups compassionate to them, since the end of 2008.⁵⁴ 42 fuel containing vehicles were destroyed in a particular event of 2008. 300 fanatics raided Port World Logistics facility in Peshawar and set aflame six containers and ninety-six stock trucks in the same year. Necessities for NATO in Afghanistan were blocked by Pakistan for seven days when two combatants of Pakistan were executed within the boundary of Pakistan by NATO helicopter in 2010.

On 26th November, 2011 there was a repetition of same incidence on the Pak-Afghan frontier with the assassination a dozen of Pakistani troops. Both the routes were obstructed by Pakistan till July 2012. The foreign military was provided provisions by the northern distribution network which was long and costly but somewhat safer from assaults of antagonistic fundamentals in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It passed through Russia and Central Asia. It was not a realistic alternative for long. The Southern Distribution Network was efficient for conveyance of merchandises as well as cheaper than Northern Distribution Network. In April 2012 consultations between USA and Pakistan nosedived after Pakistan was unable to acquire an unconditional justification from US for an ariel raid on check posts of Pakistan along the Pak-Afghan boundary. On 15th April, 2012 the federal government office in Washington negated to offer an excuse after assaults in Afghan capital and other cities by Taliban which assenting to armed and intelligence officers of United States emanated at the direction of the Haqqani group, a network functioning from a base in Pakistani tribal belt of North Waziristan. Spokespersons of Pakistan announced that they were unable to open the supply paths of NATO in Afghanistan without request for forgiveness. On 3rd July, 2012 Pakistan planned to revive the supply lines after American Secretary of State requested forgiveness for the Salala event and on July 31st, 2012 a settlement was contracted between Pakistani and American representatives which permitted supply convoys of NATO to pass from Pakistan into Afghanistan.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ <http://www.understandingwar.org/pakistan-and-afghanistan> accessed on 29/7/14

⁵⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_logistics_in_the_Afghan_War accessed on 30/8/14

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan from October 1999 to March 2013 was a tumultuous one, marked by both cooperation and tension. Despite their shared cultural and religious ties, the two nations have struggled to maintain a stable and friendly relationship due to a variety of factors, including border disputes, political differences, and external influences.

During this period, Pakistan and Afghanistan faced numerous challenges, including the rise of the Taliban in both countries and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The international community faced accusations of shelter and support of terrorist organizations by Pakistan because of its connections as an adjacent country which had previously helped Taliban in many other ways. This served to deepen hostility that already existed between two countries; Afghanistan and Pakistan. The latter denied these claims while former contended that it needed to intensify efforts against terrorism committed within both countries by some cross border elements. But there were still moments of coming together and agreeing on something like how they tried jointly to fight against drug abuse, or even when both signed deals allowing each other's goods pass through their borders. Additionally, the problem of Durand line, being a contested boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, also created some conflict between them. During colonial times, the British drew the border randomly, this according to Afghanistan, who requested for this to be viewed; on the other side, Pakistan argued that the boundary was established by legal means and recognized by all nations of the world. The effect of these conflicting perspectives on the Durand Line has been to hold back relations between them since it keeps causing trouble.

Recommendations

- Pakistan and Afghanistan should do combined efforts to eradicate terrorist groups and funding networks that operate in their territories
- There should be a mutual agreement on border demarcation, the development of joint control systems at the borders can contribute to the reduction of associated anxiety and boost economic inter-trade relations.
- The enhancement in trade relations and economic relations will see the two countries enjoy amplified growth and stability.
- Both should create more person-to-person contact and cultural exchange. To accomplish this goal, they need to consider things like student exchanges; tourism promotion campaigns as well as festivals devoted to their own national days (for example – Independence Day).
- Understanding and appreciating one another's culture can help bind them together rather than separating them through hatred.
- It is essential for the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to have a dialogue that is more open and transparent. This can be achieved through regular meetings among top officials which will help resolve any unaddressed matters, facilitating cooperation.
- Engaging in confidence-building measures and trust-building initiatives is equally important for both to improve the entire tie.

- Both can possibly have sheltered and happier contacts with government's intervention. It is essential that the UN, friendly countries or even regional groupings intervene and attempt to resolve disputes that bedevil the two states at the moment.

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